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Abstract: My main aim is to argue for the legitimacy of ‘regulatory’ criminal law. Historically 
more significant as a feature of statecraft than its critics have been prepared to admit, I defend 
a number of the controversial characteristics of such law. Such features include its tendency to 
come in the form of numerous discrete offences (where the common law was satisfied with 
one or two general offences), its preoccupation with less ‘serious’ forms of wrongdoing, and its 
reliance on omission-based liability. The plausibility of these claims comes through shifting the 
focus away from the favoured moral high ground of traditional critics of bureaucratic criminal 
law: the interests and concerns of the individual, as the object of criminalisation. A very large 
proportion of bureaucratic criminal law is aimed at companies, as objects of criminalisation. 
Whilst companies must be dealt with in a fair and proportionate manner by the criminal law, as 
entities they lack the capacity for emotional suffering, dignity and autonomy that would 
otherwise place greater constraints on the scope for the criminalisation of their activities. In 
developing my views, I try to maintain a healthy scepticism about the viability of identifying a 
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RE-MORALISING THE IDEA OF CRIMINAL LAW: THE ‘COUNTER-
REFORMATION’ 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of what might be called a ‘counter-
reformation’ in criminal law scholarship.1 Counter-reformation thinking advocates 
a return to the idea that the criminal law ought to be employed to try people and 
punish them only for serious kinds of wrongdoing.2 In that regard, such thinking is 
strongly associated with the case for the confinement of criminal wrongdoing to 
wrongdoing accompanied by fault,3 and exemplified mainly by wrong actions 
rather than by culpable omissions (other than in exceptional cases4). To these 
articles of faith should be added the claim that it should always be the state’s 
burden, in criminal proceedings, to prove beyond reasonable doubt that such 
wrongdoing was committed by the defendant.  I want to raise some questions 
about the strength of the case for a counter-reformation, in so far as it relates to at 
least some of these building blocks in the attempt to narrow the legitimate scope 
of the criminal law.5 To understand these questions, though, we must first sketch 
(and a sketch is all that is possible here) the developments that led to the original 
reformation of the understanding of criminal law, radically departing from the 
traditional conception of that phenomenon. 
 
THE REFORMATION IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Year by year the subordinate government of England is becoming more and 
more important […] We are becoming a much governed nation, governed by 
all manner of councils and boards and officers, central and local, high and 
low, exercising the powers which have been committed to them by modern 
statutes.6 
 
                                                     
1 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ [2000] 116 Law Quarterly Review 225; Douglas 
Husak, Over-Criminalisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); RA Duff, Answering for Crime 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); AP Simester and Andreas Von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the 
Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
2 In developing this thesis, I should not be taken to be denying that there have always been writers who 
have argued in favour of the ‘counter-reformation’ view; there have. My use of the term ‘counter-
reformation’ is merely a convenient way to describe a certain cast of thought, and how it reacts to and 
compares with a different, ‘reformation’ cast of thought. 
3 I take the point that, for some, there can be no ‘wrongdoing’ without fault, but I will not take up that 
issue here: see AP Simester, ‘A Disintegrated Theory of Culpability’, in Dennis Baker and Jeremy Horder 
(eds), The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming). 
4 On which see Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 Law 
Quarterly Review 424. 
5 See further, Jeremy Horder, ‘Harmless Wrongdoing and the Anticipatory Perspective on 
Criminalisation’, in GR Sullivan and Ian Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission of Criminal 
Harms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 79-102. 
6 Frederic W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906), 
at 501. 
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These are not the words of a Confederation of British Industry Chairman 
launching yet another broadside against the supposedly over-mighty state in the 
era of European law, but the words of no less a figure than FW Maitland, lecturing 
in the late 1880s. In that regard, the background to the ‘reformation’ view of 
criminal law was the significant expansion of regulatory criminal offences during 
the mid-19th century.7 Amongst other catalysts for regulatory activity that proved 
potent in Victorian England, Governments caught what Carolyn Steadman has 
aptly called ‘inspection fever’.8 Important examples of the fever’s symptoms being 
displayed were the powers given to Factory inspectorates (Factories Acts, from 
1833), and Poor Law Commissioners (Poor Law Amendment Act 1834), but also 
illustrated through the establishment of numerous other bodies such as 
‘undertakers’ empowered to manage and control markets and fairs (Markets and 
Fairs Act 1847). In many such instances, the executive bodies were themselves 
granted delegated powers, under what Bentham termed more generally ‘a sort of 
imperfect mandate [left][...] to the subordinate power-holder to fill up’,9 to make 
rules breach of which could be a criminal offence.10 Nonetheless, according to 
Nicola Lacey,11 up to and including the time of Sir James Stephen,12 many criminal 
law writers of the 17th and 18th centuries, such as Blackstone or Hale, regarded the 
criminal law as having a narrower but distinctive morally legitimate field of 
operation.13 For these writers (so the argument runs), what made the central case 
of a ‘truly criminal’ offence central was its connection to certain kinds of serious 
moral wrongdoing: broadly speaking, offences against religion, against the state, 
against the person or against property.14 By the time Stephen was writing his 
history of the criminal law in the late 19th century, the sheer number of regulatory 
offences on the statute book that did not very obviously fit within this field of 
operation had become all-too evident. Stephen noted that so large in number and 
varied in character were these offences that, ‘it would be practically impossible in 
such a work as this to give anything like a full account of them within any 
moderate compass’,15 even though, in Stephen’s words, some of these offences, 
‘relate to matters of the utmost importance and the deepest historical interest’.16 
                                                     
7 William H Greenleaf, A Much Governed Nation, Vol II (London: Routledge, 1987), at 534. 
8 Carolyn Steadman, Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces 1856-
1880 (London: Routledge, 1984), at 54. See also Oliver Macdonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution 
in Government: A Re-appraisal’ (1958) 2 The Historical Journal 52, at 58. 
9 CW Everett (ed), Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined (New York, 1945), at 109, cited by 
Greenleaf, n. 7 above, at 532. 
10 See e.g. Markets and Fairs Act 1847, section XLII (granting powers to make rules), and section XLIII 
(making breach of these rules a criminal offence). In 1819-20, ten statutes passed in that year conferred 
rule-making authority on ministers, commissioners or other executive bodies, but in 1860 33 statutes 
passed had the same effect: Greenleaf, n. 7 above. 
11 Nicola Lacey, ‘Legal Constructions of Crime’, in Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan and Robert Reiner 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 185. 
12 Sir James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: McMillan, 1883, 3 vols). 
13 For more on Bentham’s views, see n. 41 below. 
14 Although these writers were, of course, perfectly well aware of the existence of regulatory criminal 
offences that fell outside this field of operation. 
15 Stephen, n. 12 above, at 263. 
16 Stephen, n. 12 above, vol iii, at 264. 
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Like his predecessors, though, Stephen felt able to shrug off the need for even a 
cursory analysis of such offences because, in his view (repeatedly emphasised), 
they, ‘have so very faint and slight a connection with the criminal law [“properly 
so-called”, he might have added] that it would be out of place to enter upon that 
history at length in a work like the present’.17 
That self-confidence in the proper scope of the criminal law remained 
reflected in the content of criminal law courses and of the textbooks that came to 
serve them during the 20th century: including Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law,18 
and, most famously, Glanville Williams’s Textbook of the Criminal Law.19 However, 
the further expansion of the regulatory state in the first half of the 20th century 
undermined the confidence of many – including Williams himself – that, putting 
aside pedagogic considerations, criminal law could still be given a central-case 
analysis in terms of serious wrongdoing. In fact, it was Williams himself who came 
to influence a generation of post-war lawyers and theorists with his process-driven 
definition of crime in terms of the kinds of legal proceedings (civil or criminal) 
that may follow breaches of legal rules and standards.20 Williams was unsparing in 
his criticism of distinguished commentators who, in the early part of the 20th 
century, had sought to defend the view that there was such a thing as criminal law 
properly so-called: ‘wrongdoing which directly and in serious degree threatens the 
security or well-being of society […] [when] it is not safe to leave it redressable 
only by compensation of the party injured’.21 For Williams, there could be no 
‘essence’ of crime in a world, as he saw it, dominated by mala prohibita, ‘with the 
close social and economic regimentation that seems to be an inseparable part of 
modern society’.22 By contrast, for Williams: 
 
A crime then becomes an act that is capable of being followed by criminal 
proceedings, having one of the types of outcome (punishment etc.) known to 
follow these proceedings.23 
 
Williams’s much-cited argument on this issue drew, in intellectual terms, on earlier 
process-driven definitions such as that of Kenny, who focused on the state’s 
power to halt prosecutions or pardon offenders in criminal (but not in civil) cases, 
or that of Winfield, for whom what was important was the fact that an offender 
could not bargain his or her way out of punishment in a way that is possible in 
                                                     
17 Stephen, n. 12 above, at 264. 
18 Courtney S Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (London: Macmillan, 1902). 
19 Glanville Williams, Textbook of the Criminal Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978). We should note, 
though, that the offences against religion and against the state gradually reduced in importance, as 
criminal law courses settled into a secular, individualist model still predominant today. 
20 Glanville Williams, ‘The Definition of a Crime’ [1955] Current Legal Problems 107. 
21 Sir Carleton Allen, ‘The Nature of Crime’, in his Legal Duties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), 
233-34. See also Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (Indianapolis, 1947), at 213. 
22 Williams, n. 20 above, at 115. 
23 Williams, n. 20 above, at 123. 
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civil proceedings.24 Such process-driven definitions of crime, with their Weberian 
emphasis on the roles and standards adopted and applied in virtue of office by 
officials,25 said nothing about what kinds of conduct should, or should not, be 
followed by ‘criminal’ proceedings. This – reformation – view nonetheless become 
very much an orthodoxy during the second half of the 20th century (and rightly 
so),26 when so much important work was being done on the way in which criminal 
cases falling outside the traditional fields, such as health and safety legislation, 
came to court or were dealt with in other ways.27 As Nicola Lacey has put it: 
 
Criminal law […] concerns itself with the formally established norms 
according to which individuals or groups are adjudged guilty or innocent […] 
In a system in which criminal law is regarded as a regulatory tool of 
government and in which (as in the UK) there are very weak constitutional 
constraints on what kinds of conduct can be criminally proscribed – a world 
in which everything from terrorism through dumping litter to licensing 
infractions and “raves” can be criminalised – there is little that can be said by 
way of substantive rationalisation of the nature of criminal law.28 
 
The reformation view focused on the criminal law as – in the spirit of Kelsen29 –  
a normative field of meaning: a field in which we can say that the norms30 are 
empty vessels into which any content could be poured by Government or, 
increasingly, by its bureaucratic agencies. The field was thought to be made 
meaningful as such (in a way that has now become problematic) by the presence 
of certain key procedural elements: the need for proof of the facts beyond 
reasonable doubt, the fact that proceedings were undertaken – or could be taken 
over – by agents of the state, by the availability of punishment following a finding 
of guilt, and so on.31 It could, of course, be argued that these key elements 
themselves represent a distinctive morality of the criminal law; but even if that 
                                                     
24 See n. 18 above, and Sir Percy Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1931), ch VIII, both discussed in David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th 
edition, 2011), at 13. 
25 Famously reflected in the central place given in the mid-20th century analysis of a legal system to a rule 
of recognition accepted by officials, by HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1961). There is, though, perhaps a hint of old-fashioned Austinian positivism in Williams’s unwitting shift 
from normative analysis (‘an act capable of being followed […]’), to empirical, predictive analysis (‘the 
types of outcome [punishment etc.] known to follow these proceedings’). 
26 See, for example, the section on the definition of crime in David Ormerod, n. 24 above, at 3-15. 
27 See e.g. Wesley Carson, ‘Symbolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early Factory Legislation’, in Roger 
G Hood (ed), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (London: Heinemann, 1974). 
28 Nicola Lacey, n. 11 above, at 181 & 184-85. 
29 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (A. Wedberg, trans. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), at 
61. 
30 Many of which have typically been power-conferring or declaratory in nature, imposing primary duties 
by implication rather than expressly. 
31 See, for example, Benham v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 293. The meaningfulness of the field has become 
problematic, because it has become a matter of contention whether any particular one, or all, of the key 
elements must be present if proceedings are to be regarded as criminal. 
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were true, it would be – in the spirit of Fuller32 – a morality of legal procedure, and 








Regulatory criminal law-making has long been an important dimension to state 
and legislative power. How else, one might ask, can one explain the presence in 
Magna Carta not only of the guarantee of key liberties, but also of regulatory 
criminal law-related rules dictating precise standard measurements for the sale of 
wine, ale and cloth?33 One of the features of the (process-driven) reformation view 
of criminal law is that it has little difficulty accounting for the presence of 
bureaucratic or regulatory offences within the criminal law.34 So long as such 
offences are dealt with through a process involving the key elements of criminal 
procedure (just mentioned), then they would be criminal offences. What is more, 
reformation thinking is no mere ex post facto rationalisation of early 20th century 
regulatory expansionism. With rare exceptions, courts throughout the 19th century, 
for example, consistently took the view that regulatory offences, even strict 
liability offences or those involving only a fine as punishment, were criminal 
offences.35  
By contrast, modern writers have begun re-asserting and elaborating on the 
views of Sir Carleton Allen36 that there is such a phenomenon as criminal law 
properly so-called, a phenomenon the existence of which calls into question the 
place of many regulatory offences in a criminal code.37 The emergence of the 
counter-reformation is attributable, in part, to modern angst, shared by some 
politicians and sections of the media as well as by many scholars, about the 
number of criminal offences – especially regulatory offences – that have come on 
the statute book.38 This modern angst that bears a striking similarity to the 
                                                     
32 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1965). 
33 Clause 35 reads: ‘There shall be standard measures of wine, ale, and corn (the London quarter), throughout the 
kingdom. There shall also be a standard width of dyed cloth, russet, and haberject, namely two ells within the selvedges. 
Weights are to be standardised similarly.’ In itself, of course, this clause does not create a ‘criminal offence’ in 
the modern sense. However, it would have been taken as the standard to be applied under local weights 
and measures laws in, for example, the medieval market courts of piepowder, where sales in breach of 
such measures could be treated as an offence.  
34 A definition of such offences can be found in the Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 195 
(2010), Criminal Law in Regulatory Contexts. See also Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 228. 
35 See, for example, the cases discussed in Williams, n. 20 above, at 111-12. 
36 See n. 21 above.  
37 See n. 1 above.  
38 For some political angst, see e.g. Daniel Hannan and Douglas Carswell, The Plan: Twelve Months to Renew 
Britain (London: Daniel Hannan and Douglas Carswell, 2008), ch 8. In that regard, the authors rail against 
the mushrooming of so-called ‘Quangos’. The increasing importance of these bodies as regulators in the 
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outpouring of criticism in the inter-war period of the growth of regulatory law in 
general (and of delegated power to make such law, in particular), criticism 
predictably accompanied by a ‘back-to-basics’ campaign.39 Ashworth himself starts 
his article seeking to shock us out of our complacency, by suggesting that, ‘there 
are probably around 8,000 criminal offences now, mostly created over the last 150 
years, under the varying influences of […] the expansion of regulatory 
mechanisms, and so forth’.40 With this background in mind, the counter-
reformation view of criminal law tries to reignite the back-to-basics campaign as 
follows: 
 
Legions of strict liability offences, for example, penalise relatively minor 
omissions or wrongful acts. But a core element of criminal law, from a 
normative point of view, is that the criminal sanction should be reserved for 
substantial wrongdoing [involving harm and culpability].41 
 
Ashworth’s account of criminal law, like that of its far less sophisticated early 20th 
century counterparts,42 departs from the traditional pre-reformation writers’ 
accounts in employing a more generalised notion of ‘substantial wrongdoing’ as 
the central case [‘core element’] of a criminal offence. Unlike the traditional 
accounts, it does not pick out categories of such cases – offences against religion, 
offences against the person, offences against property, and so on (although some 
of these are naturally included within the notion of substantial wrongdoing).43 In 
taking that course, Ashworth’s account is obviously better fitted for – indeed, 
perhaps inspired by – the ideals of the non-perfectionist, secular liberal state, in 
which criminal justice is broadly seen in night watchman terms as founded on the 
equal protection of important liberties, a value regarded as lexically prior to 
                                                                                                                                       
1980s and 1990s owed a good deal to the burgeoning of sectoral regulation following the privatisation of 
a number of sectors of the economy formerly subject to state control: see e.g. Maher M Dabbah, ‘The 
Relationship between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators’ [2011] 70 Cambridge Law Journal 
113. The authors’ complaints are much the same as those which met the expansion of various boards, 
‘undertakers’, inspectors and other officials – including the police –  involved in regulation, from the 
middle of the 19th century. 
39 See e.g. Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929); Sir Carleton Allen, Bureaucracy 
Triumphant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931). See also the view expressed by Glanville Williams, at 
n. 20 above. The back-to-basics campaign, so far as the ‘evil’ of delegated powers is concerned, is 
reviewed briefly in Greenleaf, n. 7 above, ch 6. 
40 Ashworth,  n. 1 above, at 226. 
41 Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 240 (my emphasis). It would be possible to date the origins of some elements 
of this view to enlightenment thinking, and in particular to Bentham’s view that a criminal law must 
address only ‘mischiefs’ so grave that the punishment of them produces overall less evil than would the 
continued toleration of the mischief. Part of this assessment for Bentham, as for Ashworth, involved 
consideration of whether leaving the matter to the civil would be as efficacious in deterring the mischief: 
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (ii), 1.4, cited by Kenny, n. 18 above, at 24. 
42 See Sir Carleton Allen, n. 20 above. 
43 I have sought to criticise the focus on ‘substantial wrongdoing’ as an effective constraint on 
criminalisation in Horder, n. 5 above. 
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concerns about security more generally and (even more clearly) prior to concerns 
about moral or spiritual disintegration.44 
 
(2) PLAYING THE NUMBERS GAME: SOME HISTORICAL NOTES 
 
At this point, it is worth subjecting to scrutiny one driver behind counter-
reformation thinking. This is the more or less clearly articulated idea that there are 
now ‘too many’ criminal offences. It seems reasonable to infer that Ashworth 
believes that 8,000 criminal offences on the statute book (and at common law) is a 
great deal too many, and he is not alone amongst distinguished criminal law 
scholars in holding such a view.45 The belief that citizens are hemmed in on all 
sides by extensive and intrusive criminal legislation (and by regulatory 
requirements more generally), and hence dependent on the favourable discretion 
of prosecutors to maintain their freedom, is, of course, not a new belief. In 1762, 
Oliver Goldsmith spoke of the gap he perceived to exist between the number of 
enforceable criminal laws, and the number of instances in which they were actually 
enforced: 
 
There is scarcely an Englishman who does not almost every day of his life 
offend with impunity against some express law, and for which in a certain 
conjuncture of circumstances he would not receive punishment. Gaming-
houses, preaching at prohibited places, assembled crowds, nocturnal 
amusements, public shows, and an hundred other instances are forbid and 
frequented. These prohibitions are useful; though it be prudent in their 
magistrates, and happy for their people, that they are not enforced, and none 
but the venal or mercenary attempt to enforce them.46 
 
Goldsmith’s views were noted by AV Dicey over 120 years on, and similar 
observations about the perceived scale of criminalisation were being made at that 
                                                     
44 Ashworth is famous as a critic of the notion that concerns for liberty and justice must merely be 
‘balanced’ against a concern for security and public order: see Andrew Ashworth, 'Criminal Procedure, 
Human Rights and Balance' in Thomas Elholm et al (ed), Ikke kun Straf: Festskrift til Vagn Greve (Jurist- og 
Okonomforbundets Forlag 2008). On the so-called ‘lexical’ priority of liberty, see John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 266. 
45 See, for example, Douglas Husak’s magisterial treatment of the subject as it applies to Federal law in 
the USA in his Over-criminalisation (n. 1 above); John Spencer, ‘The Drafting of Criminal Justice Legislation 
– Need it be so Impenetrable?’ [2008] Cambridge Law Journal 585. 
46 Oliver Goldsmith, Works, vol 111 (John Murray, 1854), 194-95. For similar contemporary criticisms, 
see Archdeacon Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785 ed.) at p. 504, and Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69), vol 4, at 2-4. In highlighting the lack of 
enforcement of existing laws, Goldsmith is alluding to the ‘common informer’ system under which a 
private individual bringing an offender to justice would share in any fine imposed (‘the venal or 
mercenary’). The system was ineffective in a number of ways. For various reasons I cannot go into here, 
from Tudor times onwards (and probably long before), only some 2-3% of the courts’ time was occupied 
by such offences. 
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later date by FW Maitland, in his analysis of what he called active and negative 
duties, imposed by the state: 
 
[T]urn from active duties to negative duties, duties which consist in 
forbearance only and see how we are surrounded by prohibitions: the list of 
offences for which one may be punished summarily by justices of the peace is 
enormous.47 
 
As Maitland was well aware, many of these offences were by the late Victorian 
period when he was writing already commonly created through the use of 
secondary legislation, whose use became increasingly controversial in the early 20th 
century. This is what Cecil Carr said about the phenomenon (and he was not 
alone), in his famous lectures on delegated legislation published in 1921: 
 
In mere bulk the child now dwarfs the parent. Last year, while 82 Acts of 
Parliament were placed on the statute book, more than ten times as many 
“Statutory Rules and Orders” of a public character were officially registered 
under the Rules Publication Act. The annual volume of public general 
statutes for 1920 occupied less than 600 pages; the two volumes of statutory 
rules and orders for the same period occupy about five times as many. The 
excess in mere point of bulk of delegated legislation over direct legislation has 
been visible for nearly thirty years.48 
 
It is interesting to speculate on what Carr’s view would have been, had he focused 
specifically on the criminal laws passed in 1920. Adopting the interpretation of 
separate criminal offences set out in R v Courtie,49 between 150 and 190 offences – 
the vast bulk of which are regulatory in character – were created by primary 
legislation alone in 1920, with at least a further 80 created in secondary legislation 
passed in that year.50 Naturally, civil servants in the mid-20th century were well 
aware of the potential for controversy in the use of the criminal law to help 
                                                     
47 Maitland, n. 6 above, at 505. 
48 See Cecil T Carr, Delegated Legislation; Three Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 2. 
49 [1984] AC 463 (CA). Ashworth (n. 1 above, n.8) does not take that approach to counting offences. He 
takes a less expansive approach that involves counting as one offence individual provisions within 
statutes that create offences, rather than looking to the number of separate offences within the provision. 
As he rightly concedes, that entails an underestimation – in my view, a very large and significant one – of 
the numbers of offences created in any given year. The difference of approach illustrates some of the 
methodological difficulties facing scholars seeking to play the numbers game. Indeed, I will later criticise 
the adoption of a Courtie approach as liable to create distortions in analysis: see text at n. 74 below. 
50 Not the least of the difficulties facing any scholar seeking to decide how many criminal offences were 
created in a single year is that, as the state has sought to extend its governance through law, statutes have 
become more systematised, becoming inter-dependent and closely related. So, for example, a statute in 
year X may make it henceforth a criminal offence for anyone to attempt to breach – or to become 
complicit in the breach of - regulations made criminal as substantive offences in year X minus 1; or, 
conversely and much more commonly, a year X statute may make it a criminal offence to breach 
regulations that may be passed in the future under powers granted by the year X statute; and so forth. 
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achieve regulatory ends. Writing in 1954, Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-
Secretary of State for the Home Department, claimed that: 
 
It is part of the Home Secretary’s general duty to watch that the penalty 
provisions included in legislation promoted by other Departments are not out 
of keeping with those in existing statutes, and that they are reasonable in 
themselves. The creation of new criminal offences and penalties may 
sometimes have unexpected consequences, and the Home Office is constantly on 
its guard to foresee and prevent them.51 
 
The same claim continues to be made over 50 years later by the Ministry of 
Justice, which issues guidance on principles of restraint in the creation of criminal 
offences by other Departments of state.52 Even so, Newsam conceded that the 
power to create criminal offences had been considerably widened by the removal 
from the Home Office’s regulatory jurisdiction of a wide range of social and 
economic activity, which was now the responsibility of officials in mushrooming 
Departments such as Health, Transport, Housing, Labour, Agriculture and 
Fisheries, and Education. Such divisions of labour between increasing numbers of 
separate Departments were motivated in part by a perceived need for 
specialisation, and each Department that saw itself in those terms accordingly 
exercised rule-making powers, including powers to create criminal offences, on the 
basis of an ‘expert’ theory of authority. This was a development that had long 
been analysed or predicted by amongst others Karl Marx, who saw such divisions 
of labour – at least when justified by expert or technical considerations – as a 
necessary evil in modern society.53 However, in spite of this, in Newsam’s view, 
these developments had not diminished in any way more generally the volume of 
work with which Home Office officials were expected to cope, leaving the Home 
Office hard-pressed to control and direct the criminal law-making activities of 
more or less newly-minted Departments of state.54 No doubt, few Home Office 
ministers since then would beg to differ on that point. 
 
(3) PLAYING THE NUMBERS GAME: THE NORMATIVE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE 
OF NUMBERS. 
 
What does this tell us about the over-proliferation thesis? An initial difficulty for 
anyone seeking to defend the over-proliferation thesis is (as the Law Commission 
                                                     
51 Sir Frank Newsam, The Home Office (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), at 125 (my emphasis). 
52 http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/criminal-offences-gateway-guidance.pdf:  
 ‘A gateway established to prevent the proliferation of unnecessary new criminal offences’. 
53 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol 1) (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), at 781-94. 
See also Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1947), at 339: ‘Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of 
knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational’ (my emphasis). 
54 Newsam, n. 51 above, at 125-26. 
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has observed55)  to know how many offences would be about right, or how many 
would be for that matter too few, knowledge of which is surely important if the 
thesis is, as such, to gain significant traction. Perhaps 3500 offences, would be 
about right? Would, by contrast, 1500 offences be too few? These questions only 
have to be asked for their unhelpfulness to be plain for all to see. Secondly, over-
proliferation theses typically beg important questions. For example, putting it 
crudely, are fewer numbers of broadly defined offences better (and in what 
respect?) than large numbers of highly specific ones?  Fewer specific offences 
generally entails a smaller number of more broadly defined ones; but that 
reduction in quantity may lead to a corresponding deterioration in the quality of 
the criminal law. It would, for example, perhaps be possible to abolish a swath of 
specific animal welfare offences, and to seek to rely instead on a single broad 
crime of causing, or risking,56 unnecessary suffering to protected animals.57 To 
take that (ideologically speaking) ‘common law’ course, though, would be to 
sacrifice a large measure of legal certainty respecting what conduct amounts to a 
criminal offence on the altar of crime number reduction, a certainty highly prized 
by many of the adherents of the over-proliferation thesis themselves.58 Such a 
policy would place a heavy burden on the courts adequately to develop the 
meaning of the broader offence in its new role. Yet, we can have little confidence 
that this burden will be effectively discharged, not least because the courts have 
been conspicuously poor at settling on a coherent policy to determine the meaning 
of such offences, as has been the case with public nuisance.59 Quite simply, as 
amateurs dabbling in the complex, highly varied and expert-dominated world of 
regulatory control, Appeal Court judges will never be up to the task, even if the lis 
inter partes were suitable – and it is manifestly wholly unsuitable – as a means of 
developing a regulatory strategy for criminal offences (or, for that matter, civil 
penalties). 
It is possible to imagine a world in which guidelines on meaning and on law 
enforcement policy are issued by departmental and industry experts that relate to 
every context in which the general offence of causing or risking unnecessary 
animal suffering may take place: to name but a few such contexts, the commercial 
transport of animals,60 the disturbance of basking sharks,61 the possession of a live 
badger,62 the maintenance and running of dog kennels,63 pet shops,64 and 
                                                     
55 Law Commission, n. 34 above, at para 3.18. 
56 Risking harm would have to be added to the existing general offence of causing unnecessary suffering 
to a protected animal contrary the Animal Welfare Act 2006, s.4, in order to provide adequate coverage, 
not least when the concern is with the handling and upkeep of very sensitive animals or of large numbers 
of animals. 
57 A similar point could be made about the vast numbers of specific environmental offences, which could 
be in theory be dealt with solely through the common law offence of public nuisance. 
58 Andrew Ashworth, 'Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid it' (2011) 74 Modern Law 
Review 1. 
59 See John Spencer, ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) Cambridge Law Journal 55. 
60 See, e.g. the Welfare of Animals During Transport Order 1992. 
61 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s.5. 
62 Protection of Badgers Act 1992, s.4. 
63 Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963. 
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circuses,65 the possession of dangerous wild animals,66 the failure to provide a 
proper living environment for a pet cat,67 or the sale of goldfish at fairs.68 
However, when underpinned with an offence as vague as causing or risking the 
unnecessary suffering of a protected animal, such an approach can only serve to 
set up a whole series of unhelpful tensions between the principle of legality and 
the rule of law,69 leaving citizens - and those tasked with regulating their conduct - 
in acres of legal no-man’s land. What Glanville Williams once claimed to be a 
defect of mala prohibita would in all probability turn out to be the defect of turning 
back to a common law approach: ‘it is utterly inevitable that the citizen can only 
find out the limits of the permissible by bringing down the law on his own head’.70 
It is one of the unsung virtues of clear and specific secondary legislation (including 
criminalising legislation) made under primary legislation directed at regulating 
particular industries or practices, backed by an enforcement strategy informed by 
experts following consultation with industry specialists, that it is capable of co-
ordinating behaviour in the interests of the common good in a way that general 
common law-style offences cannot hope to do. 
Accordingly, the legislature has for decades (indeed, longer) sought to specify 
in some detail what failures in point of animal welfare will attract criminal 
sanctions in regulatory contexts. Consider section 5 of the Welfare of Animals 
During Transport Order 1992, made under the Animal Health Act 1981, that 
makes it a criminal offence to fail to abide by the following conditions: 
 
Persons having control of animal transport undertakings 
 
5.  Subject to article 6 below, every person having control of any animal 
transport undertaking which transports animals in the course of business or 
trade shall—  
(a) ensure that the animals are entrusted only to persons possessing the 
knowledge necessary to administer appropriate care to the animals in 
transport;  
(b) ensure, in the case of animals travelling unaccompanied, that the 
consignee is prepared to receive them;  
                                                                                                                                       
64 The Pet Animals Act 1951. 
65 The Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925.  
66 The Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976. 
67 Animal Welfare Act 1986, s.9, and see, in relation to this, the Code of Practice for the Welfare of Cats: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/pb13332-cop-cats-091204.pdf.  
68 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s. 11. 
69 See, in a different context, John M Finnis, 'Invoking the Principle of Legality against the Rule of Law' 
(2011) New Zealand Law Review [2010] 601. 
70 Williams, n. 20 above, at 115. Williams probably took this view of mala prohibita because, at the time he 
was writing, there were no systems of the kind currently widespread in the world of regulation devoted to 
giving publicity to and guidance on a person’s obligations and on how to comply with the law: see 
Horder, n. 5 above. 
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(c) ensure that the animals are transported without delay to their place of 
destination;  
(d) ensure that during the journey the consignment is accompanied by a 
certificate signed by him or on his behalf stating:  
(i) the origin and ownership of the animals,  
(ii) their place of departure and place of destination, and  
(iii) the date and time of departure;  
(e) draw up for journeys exceeding 24 hours a journey plan showing—  
(i) the arrangements for the animals to be rested, fed and watered, and (if 
necessary) unloaded and given accommodation appropriate to their species;  
(ii) the arrangements for feeding and watering in the event that the planned 
journey is changed or disrupted,  
and ensure that during the journey the consignment is accompanied by the 
journey plan; and  
(f) ensure that copies of the journey plan and the certificate required by this 
article are kept for a period of six months from the end of the journey and 
produce them at the request of an inspector. 
 
Was the passing of this Order an example of the unnecessary proliferation of 
regulations backed by criminal sanctions, or alternatively, was it good statecraft 
attentive to the need for clarity and certainty concerning the taking of important 
steps to avoid animal suffering?  I do not believe that, to preserve the purity of the 
‘true’ criminal law, such rules may be justified only if they end only in some kind 
of civil penalty. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(RSPCA), for example, said in response to the Law Commission’s proposal to 
replace a greater number of criminal sanctions with administrative penalties: 
 
The RSPCA also consider that the power to impose a system of civil 
sanctions already enacted in the Regulatory Enforcement Sanctions Act 2008 
and introduced in the Environmental Sanctions Order 2010 should not be 
extended beyond environmental offences (which was the intended ambit of 
these pieces of legislation) onto the [Animal Welfare Act 2006]. Prosecutions 
concerning sentient beings are in a different category to other types of 
prosecutions. Offences under the [Animal Welfare Act] should remain 
criminal offences without the introduction of a system of civil sanctions.71 
 
So, is unjustifiably risking animal suffering in itself necessarily a ‘serious’ wrong 
that thereby qualifies as a candidate for ‘true’ criminalisation? Or, is the real truth 
that such wrongs vary enormously in terms of seriousness, and that there is no 
clear discernible tipping point at which they become ‘truly’ criminal?72 
                                                     
71 http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp195_Criminal_Liability_responses.pdf., at para 1.26. 
72 See the discussion of ‘seriousness’ as a benchmark in Horder, n. 5 above, and see also the concluding 
section below. 
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For Ashworth and Zedner, it is late 20th century legislators who must take a 
large slice of the blame for supposed over-criminalisation. They say, ‘the pace of 
change appears to have quickened in the final quarter of the last century [the 20th 
century] and this acceleration is continuing’.73 Yet, methodological difficulties 
beset any attempt to prove or disprove the numerical element to this thesis, 
whichever approach one adopts to decide the ‘how many?’ and ‘too many?’ 
questions.74 For example, here is one problem with adopting the approach to 
counting set out in R v Courtie, in order to prove the thesis.75 It is the difficulty of 
knowing whether the difference between formally separate criminal offences is so 
significant that their separateness is really an important factor in any critique of 
(supposed) over-proliferation. Consider the aforementioned Welfare of Animals 
During Transport Order 1992. A question arises concerning how appropriate it is 
to see the 1992 Order as having (needlessly?) added so many offences to the list. 
This is because the mischiefs separately addressed are so closely related. This is an 
issue that must be addressed in considering quite literally thousands of regulations 
creating criminal offences in the UK. When offences are closely inter-related and 
mutually interdependent in the constitution of a coherent scheme of protection, as 
in clause 5 (set out above), is it right to criticise each separate offence for having 
on its own contributed in a some significant way to an undesirable ‘proliferation’ 
of criminal offences? Bear in mind that the separation of the wrongs in section 5 is 
meant primarily to enhance clarity and specificity for the purposes of fair and 
effective regulation, so far as both enforcers and transporters are concerned. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that it is misleading in this instance – as it would 
equally be in thousands more instances of similar secondary legislation – to point 
to this section of the 1992 Order as an example of the ‘lost cause’ that our 
supposedly runaway criminal law-making process is claimed to be.  
In this, as in many other respects, much modern legislation simply follows the 
examples set by legislation creating criminal offences in regulatory contexts going 
back many years. The legislature has long preferred highly specific individual 
criminal wrongs, moving away from continued reliance on very broad general 
offences of a common law type (other than as a back-stop).76 This does no more 
than reflect what is now a largely unquestioned feature of good statecraft: the 
modern duty (the origins of which lie in the Victorian era) to provide for clear, 
                                                     
73 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing 
Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21, at 21. I have 
conceded that increasing specialisation and multiplication of executive and quango functions has led to an 
increase in the volume of criminal legislation over the last 25 years: see n. 38 above. The Law 
Commission has made the same point: see n. 34 above, at para 1.21-1.24. 
74 See text at n.49 above.  
75 [1984] AC 463 (CA). See text at n. 49 above. The Courtie approach was not, of course, created by the 
Court of Appeal for the purpose for which it is now being used. 
76 An excellent analysis, where public nuisance is concerned, can be found in John Spencer, n. 59 above. 
Perhaps unmatched for the level of detail provided is the Locomotives Act 1861, s.3, which saw the 
creation of a one-sentence, 158 word offence concerned in great details with the size and composition of 
permitted Locomotives and their tyres. 
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fine-tuned regulatory governance in the promotion of safety and public welfare in 
an ever-widening variety of contexts.77 The legislation of 1920 is replete with 
statutes providing a highly context-specific criminal law basis for, or dimension to, 
such governance, examples being: the Census Act 1920, the Dangerous Drugs Act 
1920, the Ready Money Football Betting Act 1920, the Seeds Act 1920, the Roads 
Act 1920, the Firearms Act 1920, the Official Secrets Act 1920, the Employment 
of Women, Young Persons and Children Act 1920, and many more (and this is 
not to mention all the regulations and orders also passed in that year to the same 
end, such as the American Gooseberry Mildew Order 1920).  
Many of these Acts and Orders drew in to the process of regulatory 
governance already existing professional bodies, officials and employers. The Acts 
and Orders sometimes included a role for such people in enforcement or in 
licensing, such as Chief Police Officers (Firearms Act 1920), the Registrar-General 
(Census Act 1920), medical practitioners (Dangerous Drugs Act 1920), and 
employers (Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act 1920). 
However, when it comes to the delivery of regulatory goals it is also worth noting 
that whilst in 1902 there were only 50,000 non-industrial civil servants, by 1939 
the number had risen to 163,000, and by 1944 it was 505,000.78 Against that 
background, moreover, we should note that some of the 1920 legislation 
demonstrates that long before accession to the EU, the passing of regulatory 
criminal legislation has been the product of international agreements or of 
international standards, rather than of some peculiarly English taste for ‘the 
teasing vigilance of the perpetual superintendence of law’.79 Examples of such 
quintessentially white collar, civil service-led criminal law are the Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1920, that sought to give effect to the Hague International Opium 
Convention of 1912, and the Employment of Women, Young Persons and 
Children 1920, that sought to give effect to International Labour Organisation 
standards. In terms, then, of Governments’ ability to deliver regulatory strategies 
(including widespread use of criminal offences), through increases in the human 
resources of officialdom needed to carry out that activity, it is highly arguable that 
the really significant modern period was the first half of the 20th century, and not 





                                                     
77 Care must be taken in interpreting this claim. It is obviously no part of the claim that the 19th and 20th 
centuries saw, from modest beginnings, a carefully stage-managed march towards wide-scale regulatory 
control. Historians still debate the question of the extent to which the 19th century in particular saw any 
state ‘planning’ of an overall strategic kind. For AJP Taylor, for example, England simply, ‘stumbled into 
the modern administrative State without design’: Alan Taylor, Laissez-faire and State Intervention in 
Nineteenth-century Britain, (London: MacMillan, 1972), at 236 
78 Strikingly, there are now only 435,000 non-industrial civil servants: 
http://www.civilservant.org.uk/numbers.pdf.  
79 An early 19th century MP’s phrase to describe the evils of codification: Hansard, xix, col. 647 (March 29, 
1811). 
                         1/2014 
 
 16
(4) OVER-PROLIFERATION THESES, THE EU ‘PROBLEM’, AND THE 
CONCEPT OF ‘CORPORATE’ CRIME. 
 
According to Julia Black, regulation is, ‘the sustained and focused attempt to alter 
the behaviour of others according to standards or goals with the intention of 
producing a broadly defined outcome or outcomes, which may involve 
mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour 
modification’.80 Precisely because they focus on aspects of strategic planning in the 
role of the employer, of the doctor, of the vet, of the public official, or of whoever 
else is charged with playing a part in policy implementation, regulatory criminal 
laws are preventative offences, aimed primarily at risk-reduction rather than with 
harm already done. The last point is picked up by Ashworth and Zedner who treat 
regulatory criminal law with some suspicion as a largely unwelcome encrustation 
on good old-fashioned, ‘truly criminal’ law:  
 
The historic orientation of the criminal justice system towards reactive 
policing and post-hoc punishment is [now] overlaid by a pro-active, 
preventative rationale that seeks to avert harms before they occur.81 
 
In that regard, though, it is telling that, in his powerful argument decrying the 
expansionary tendencies of the criminal law, Ashworth does not take as one of his 
main case studies a piece secondary regulatory legislation. Instead, he concentrates 
a great deal of his fire on a preventative measure that is, strictly speaking, 
epiphenomenal in criminal law terms, namely the Anti-Social Behaviour Order, a 
two-step prohibition not regarded by the courts as in as of itself a criminal 
offence.82 Whether or not Anti-Social Behaviour Orders were ever justified, that 
focus is telling. It is an illustration of what might more broadly be considered to be 
the intense concern of many criminal lawyers interested in criminalisation with 
individual or group ‘trouble-making’ (and violence) in towns and cities – especially 
when engaged in by disadvantaged young people - and with the state’s continuing 
commitment to what is viewed as a disproportionate and often unnecessary 
criminal law response to such ‘trouble-making’ or violence.83 Whatever its merits 
in its context (and I do not underestimate its moral importance), this liberal-
individualist Dickensian focus, as common on the ‘right’ as on the ‘left’ of the 
spectrum of criminological thought,84 leaves too little examined what became 
                                                     
80 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1. 
81 Ashworth and Zedner, n. 73 above, at 40. In fairness, their critique of pre-emptive crimes is also 
concerned with their use in non-regulatory contexts. 
82 See Ashworth, n. 1 above. 
83 See Husak, n.1 above. 
84 See e.g. George L Kelling and James Q Wilson, ‘Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood 
Safety’, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/; contrast: 
Robert J Sampson and Stephen W Raudenbush, ‘Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social 
Construction of "Broken Windows”’ (2004) Social Psychology Quarterly 67 (4): 319–42. 
  
Jeremy Horder                                          Bureaucratic ‘Criminal’ Law: Too Much of a Bad Thing?  
 
 17
during the 20th century – and still remains – the biggest driver of criminalisation in 
modern Britain. This is the attempt to regulate the activities of businesses, and of 
small businesses in particular, not least (in more recent times) in order to deal with 
the challenges of creating a single European market. 
For example, historically, a great deal of legislation underpinned by criminal 
offences has always been aimed at farming and allied trades, even though this 
sector constitutes only 2-3% of UK enterprises, and the advent of the single 
European market has sustained that trend. As a recent illustration, let me take 
2008 as an example. In that year, 440 offences were brought on to the statute 
book. Perhaps as few as 30 of these offences were aimed at private individuals. Of 
the rest, aimed at business activity, 179 offences were created by the Department 
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 133 of which were aimed 
specifically at the agricultural sector. One of the main influences here may be 
(there is not enough evidence to prove it) the impact of European law in seeking 
to create a level playing field for trading and the harmonisation of good trade 
practices throughout the EU. Notoriously, the EU is responsible for far less UK 
legislation than the general public supposes, even though 92% of European rules 
and standards are incorporated into law in the UK by secondary legislation. For 
example, between 1987 and 1997, of the 27,999 statutory instruments issued only 
7.9% made reference to European legislation (although this rises to 15% if local 
SIs are excluded).85 Having said that, the Government department that was most 
concerned, in its own activities, with turning European rules and standards into 
secondary legislation (‘Euro SIs’) was what is now the DEFRA, but was formerly 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Of all the secondary 
legislation passed under MAFF’s aegis between 1987 and 1997,86 no less than 
51.3% of these laws can be classed as Euro SIs. By contrast, 28% (still a 
substantial figure) of the secondary legislative activity of what was then the 
Department for Trade and Industry can be called Euro SIs, together with 21% of 
the secondary legislative activity of the Department of Transport.  
These figures are significant, because the criminal law has historically had to 
be a mainstay of EU implementation strategy in many areas of business activity for 
almost all UK Government Departments, given that there has until relatively 
recently been no tradition of creating a category of administrative or ‘civil’ 
penalties to supplement or replace ‘criminal’ legislation.87 A cursory examination 
of Euro SIs created by secondary legislation in any given year since accession to 
the EU (further research is needed on this point) often reveals a high proportion 
that create criminal offences, the bulk of which are usually included by what was 
MAFF and is now DEFRA. For example, in 2008, it seems likely that over 190 of 
                                                     
85 Edward Page, ‘The impact of European Legislation in British Public Policy-Making: a Research Note’ 
(1998) 76 Public Administration 803. 
86 Such as the Welfare of Animals during Transport Order 1992, discussed above. 
87 Law Commission, n. 34 above. I should not be taken here to be endorsing a clear distinction between 
‘criminal’ law and ‘administrative penalties’. 
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the 440 offences created in that year were meant to give effect to common 
European standards relating to the single European market. 
 
(5) ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES: THE COUNTER-REFORMATION 
THINKERS’ HOLY GRAIL? 
 
At this point, I must directly confront the argument that it is not the number of 
offences that is the problem, so much as the fact that so many of the wrongs 
concerned are regarded as ‘criminal’ offences, when they should be treated instead 
as civil or administrative offences.88 According to Ashworth and Zedner, ‘[t]here is 
a strong argument for confining criminal liability to offences that require fault, and 
of creating a separate category of MAPs (Monetary Administrative Penalties)[…]’89 
to punish and deter other kinds of wrong. Certainly, few people seriously doubt 
that there is plenty of legitimate work for civil or administrative penalties to do in 
some cases;90 but is the answer really as simple as they suggest? Regrettably, it is 
not. To begin with, such penalties – MAPs –  have been condemned by some as 
neither fish (‘truly’ criminal), nor fowl (civil law wrong), or have been branded 
cheap and not-so-cheerful substitutes for ‘truly’ criminal law, yet carrying much 
more severe fixed punishments in some cases than would ever have been imposed 
through the exercise of a criminal court’s sentencing discretion.91 In that, 
ironically, the critics of such penalties share common ground with some of the 
penalties’ supporters, who have decried the criminal courts’ tendency to take 
regulatory crime far less seriously than they should, by imposing fines amounting 
to far less than the costs saved by the offender in committing the offence.92  
Further, in wishing away regulatory offending as best dealt with by civil or 
monetary penalties rather than by the ‘true’ criminal law, counter-reformation 
thinkers fail to acknowledge that the spread of such penalties can be seen as 
challenging – rather than embodying or symbolising – the idea that there is 
something morally distinctive about ‘criminal’ sanctions. The European Court 
reserves the right to decide the essentially contested question whether or not an 
offence is in substance criminal, or a civil wrong, according to a range of criteria it 
determines for itself. That creates a theoretical and practical vicious circle in 
relation to the answering of the question: ‘what is a criminal offence’? So, any 
cordon sanitaire that a counter-reformation thinker might seek to erect around ‘truly’ 
                                                     
88 See e.g. RA Duff, ‘Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law’, in RA Duff, Lindsay Farmer, SE 
Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), at 102-05; Victor Tadros, ‘Criminalisation and Regulation’, ibid, at 174. 
89 Ashworth and Zedner, n. 73 above, at 33. 
90 See Law Commission, n. 34 above. 
91 Robin White, “'Civil Penalties': Oxymoron, Chimera and Stealth Sanction?" (2010) 126 Law Quarterly 
Review 593; and see the response of Professor Colin Reid to the Law Commission’s Consultation paper 
(text at n. 92 below): 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp195_Criminal_Liability_responses.pdf.  
92 See Law Commission, n. 34 above, Appendix A. 
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criminal offences, to preserve them from adulteration by mere civil penalties, must 
inevitably remain porous in practice and contentious in theory. The implications 
of this have been set out by Reid (if I can be forgiven for citing his work at 
length): 
 
The important fundamental distinction could be seen as marking out not the 
criminal law, but those laws through which the state (in whatever form) 
imposes penalties. The criminal law is only a subset of this bigger genus. 
Given the proportion of criminal offences nowadays dealt with by fixed 
penalties and a range of other statutory diversions from prosecution, how 
much of even the mainstream criminal law lives up to the traditional 
paradigm of criminal law which entails those accused of offences being 
brought to trial with punishment being imposed only by a court after due 
process designed to protect the rights of the accused? The question then 
becomes one of identifying the fundamental elements, substantive and 
procedural, which justify the state in imposing penalties of any sort and then 
finding appropriate ways of applying these in different contexts, only some of 
which may be “criminal” in our minds, but all of which must provide 
appropriate safeguards against abuse of state power. Most discussion over 
“criminalisation” misses out this vital preliminary stage, suggesting that the 
options are criminalisation or nothing, as opposed to seeing the criminal law 
as part of this wider penalty-imposing framework.93 
 
One way of construing MAPs is simply as a formalised out-of-court disposal by 
punishment of offending behaviour. If that seems plausible, then the 
understanding of society as subject to over-‘criminalisation’ is better replaced by a 
different focus. This is a focus on whether, in regulatory contexts, people are now 
potentially subject to over-penalisation respecting all manner of wrongdoing and 
risk-taking, rather than simply to over-criminalisation (as counter-reformation 
thinkers understand that notion). It seems that counter-reformation thinkers do 
not have a ready answer to that question.94 Yet, if Reid is right about the terms in 
which the debate about the legitimacy of state coercion should be conducted, the 
latter question is as – or more – important than the former.95 
There have been two recent attempts to theorise administrative penalties in a 
sophisticated way, with a view to establishing a basis for maintaining the purity of 
the ‘truly criminal’ prohibition. The first is focused on the idea that administrative 
penalties are deterrents unaccompanied by official condemnation or censure 
(parking fines writ large) whereas, normatively speaking, conviction for a genuine 
                                                     
93 http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp195_Criminal_Liability_responses.pdf., at para 1.26. 
94 Although I should mention, in fairness, that Ashworth and Zedner point to the possible net-widening 
effects of being able to impose fixed penalties, and to the fact that fixed penalties will, necessarily, bear 
down more harshly on offenders with low incomes: Ashworth and Zedner, n. 73 above, at 28. 
95 A point noted by Victor Tadros: see n. 88 above, at 175. 
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crime involves – or should involve – such condemnation or censure.96 One 
difficulty with the theory is that it runs together two slightly different ideas. First, 
there is the idea of ‘censure’, which whilst obviously a response to wrongdoing, is 
a narrow concept closely associated with an official rebuke to a public servant for 
inappropriate behaviour, historically including sexual misconduct and the use of 
bad language in the legislative chamber: what could be called ‘officials’ censure’.97 
Whilst officials’ censure is unlikely to be imposed except in cases of serious 
wrongdoing, so that it remains distinct from lesser measures such as official 
reprimands, there is nothing in the idea of officials’ censure that ties it to serious 
wrongdoing, as such. Less serious wrongdoing by a very senior trusted official, 
such as the US President, might call for officials’ censure as much because of the 
wrongdoer’s status as because the wrongdoing was serious in itself. So, it is 
strongly arguable that it is misleading to use the concept of ‘censure’ to describe an 
intrinsic element in the criminal conviction of a private individual. Indeed, in 
English law, one of the few uses of ‘public censure’ as an intrinsic part of the 
punitive process – when the Financial Services Authority publicly censures 
instances of financial wrongdoing – is as a way of penalising wrongdoing outside 
the traditional criminal courts.  
By contrast, some might consider the more general concept of 
‘condemnation’ as rightly associated with cases where serious wrongdoing is in 
issue, whatever the status of the wrongdoer; but to use the term ‘condemnation’ to 
confine the scope of wrongdoing appropriate for criminal conviction seems to beg 
the question. To describe criminal conviction as concerned, or as ideally 
concerned, with wrongdoing appropriate for ‘condemnation’ is to foreclose 
discussion of the very issue to be decided: should criminal liability be confined to 
wrongdoing that ought not to be merely criticised but condemned? Is 
condemnation not, in any event, merely very strong criticism, and thus a judgment 
of degree at one end of a spectrum rather than involving a difference of kind? 
Duff himself suggest that there can be such a thing as ‘mild’ condemnation, and 
hence concedes that: 
 
[T]he criminal law need not deal only with serious wrongs – it can also 
provide modest punishments for offences that are, while still genuine wrongs, 
relatively minor […] [R]egulations serve the common good; breaches of them 
                                                     
96 RA Duff, n. 88 above, at 102-5; Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’, in Joel 
Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).  There is, of course, nothing 
unique about the criminal law as a means of imposing official censure or condemnation. The removal of 
a knighthood, medals or other honours, in response to wrongdoing, involves such censure or 
condemnation. 
97 ‘Punishment in the House’, The New York Times, November 18th 2010, drawing on Congressional 
Research Services. 
  
Jeremy Horder                                          Bureaucratic ‘Criminal’ Law: Too Much of a Bad Thing?  
 
 21
are therefore breaches (often minor breaches) of our civic responsibilities, 
which merit (often mild) condemnation as wrongs.98 
 
The conviction-as-condemnation theory has also been criticized as putting too 
much emphasis on what is in fact a contingent element of the punishment 
process. As Tadros puts it: 
 
We can impose suffering on people to deter other people without intending 
to communicate condemnation for that person’s wrongdoing. Also, 
punishment is not distinctive from civil penalties in imposing suffering on 
people […] Fines that are imposed only in order to compensate the victims 
may make the person who is liable to pay them suffer.99 
 
For Duff, administrative penalties ‘are not marked, addressed or condemned as 
wrongs’.100 However, if, following Tadros, we take the condemnatory element out 
of this claim as being normatively supererogatory or redundant, then it becomes 
much less clear how, on the one hand, ‘true’ crimes, and on the other hand, mere 
administrative transgressions, are to be qualitatively distinguished.  
Tadros himself has an alternative theory aimed at maintaining a realm of 
purely criminal law, distinct from the world of administrative penalties. On his 
account, penalties are not aimed at making people suffer in order to deter others. 
On the contrary, for him, penalty schemes have no pretensions to deter at all, for 
all the suffering that the imposition of the penalties may cause. For Tadros, 
penalties are aimed instead at ‘redistributing benefits and burdens’.101 He 
continues, ‘penalties are aimed at ensuring that the costs of breaching regulations 
are borne by those who breach it rather than those that suffer from the breach’.102 
Ingenious though the theory is, I suggest that it turns out to be possibly even less 
convincing that the censure-or-condemnation theory it is meant to replace. To 
begin with, Tadros’s theory about official responses to regulatory wrongdoing: 
that, ‘penalties are aimed at ensuring that the costs of breaching regulations are 
borne by those who breach it’,103 does not reflect current practice, and it would be 
grossly unjust if it were to do so. Many of the significant costs of implementing 
regulatory penalties – the employment of officials, outlay in relation to any 
investigation and the making of findings, together with the costs of fine recovery 
and of conducting appeal hearings – must in fact commonly be borne by the state 
                                                     
98 RA Duff, n.1 above, at 173-74. Quite rightly, Duff adds that a system of administrative penalties can 
still co-exist with a criminal law that extends to minor wrongs. 
99 Tadros, n. 88 above, at 174. 
100 RA Duff, n. 88 above, at 103. Accordingly, Duff recommends the introduction of a specific category 
of ‘administrative offence’, a category for transgressions that do not involve ‘public wrongs’ worthy of 
censure, wrongs that, ‘properly concern us all as citizens’. Such a scheme is likely to be fraught with 
difficulty and controversy, whether or not it has been made to work in some jurisdictions: see the 
criticism of the idea by the Law Commission, n. 34 above, para 3.28-36. 
101 Tadros, n. 88 above, at 174. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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rather than by the offender. This is simply because it would be unduly harsh and 
out of proportion to make the wrongdoer bear all these costs, other than in 
exceptional cases.104 So, it is not strictly true to say that penalty schemes aim to 
ensure that, ‘costs of breaching regulations are borne by those who breach it’, nor, 
in any legal system that aspires to do justice in a fair and proportionate way, 
should it ever be true. At a deeper level, though, the theory fails to identify what is 
in fact a distinctive role for penalties for breach of an obligation in a regulatory 
scheme, separate from the role of behaviour-influencing taxation. 
Suppose that it is true, as Tadros claims, that the point of penalties is solely to 
‘redistribute[e] benefits and burdens’105 as between those governed by the 
regulatory scheme and those not governed (but possibly affected) by it. It then 
becomes unnecessary, and possibly distorting, to distinguish between a 
redistributive tax on certain kinds of regulated conduct and a penalty scheme for 
engaging in certain kinds of regulated conduct; but that seems wrong. Suppose we 
wish to improve the environmental conditions in a traffic-bound city centre, and 
we intend to make car users pay the costs of that. Amongst other things, we could 
choose either or both of charging an advance fee for bringing a car into the centre 
at certain times,106 or imposing a penalty on those found driving in the centre at 
certain times. Traditionally – and in my view rightly – the latter is a distinctive 
deterrent strategy based on the creation of a malum prohibitum. Morally speaking, 
amongst other things, when pursuing such a strategy it will be improper for an 
official to say, ‘Actually, we don’t care if people are left undeterred by and are 
willing to pay the fines, because that means more money for environmental 
improvements’. When the pursuit of regulatory penalties is not motivated in part 
by their potential to deter, it is wrong to seek to impose them.107 In particular, it 
will be improper to use them solely for redistributive purposes, in such 
circumstances. Naturally, when a penalty scheme is introduced as part of a 
redistributive revenue-raising exercise, it may be tempting to judge its overall 
success in that exercise by the financially enriching side-effects that punishing law-
breakers has. Taking that approach, a penalty scheme may turn out to be relatively 
inefficient as a revenue-raising mechanism if law-breakers are simply too few, as 
well as when they are too hard or too expensive to catch, or when extracting fines 
from them proves too difficult. As a penalty scheme, though, its function is to 
deter by the threat or imposition of a financial set-back proportionate to the malum 
                                                     
104 See, for example, the Citizens’ Advice Bureau’s report, Uncivil Recovery, into the disproportionate nature 
of the costs imposed on employees guilty of minor infractions, when charged  for civil recovery actions 
undertaken by private firms at the behest of the employer: 
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/policy/policy_publications/uncivil_recovery.htm.  
105 Tadros, n. 88 above, at 174. 
106 This option assumes that no penalty scheme is needed, because the fee is effectively impossible to 
avoid: say, barriers or traffic officers automatically turn back all drivers who try to enter the centre 
without payment of the fee beforehand, or the like. 
107 This claim intentionally over-states my case, to aid clarity in casting doubt on Tadros’ theory. In fact, 
the motivation for imposing a penalty can be just deserts-based, but I will not go into that issue here. 
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prohibitum in issue. So, the scheme should not be judged, as such, principally by the 
amount of money it raises through failures in point of deterrence; that would be 
perverse.  
By contrast, a strategy of charging an ex ante fee to drive in the city centre may 
have a simple redistributive function at its heart, revenue-raising for environmental 
improvements being its intended effect. In such a case, a transport official may 
quite properly say, ‘if, in spite of the fee, people want to keep driving in the same 
numbers into the city centre, that is fine by us, because it means more revenue for 
environmental improvements’. In pursuing the fee-charge strategy the authority 
may also wish to deter entry into the city centre, something it may try to do by 
imposing a fee sufficiently high that more people than before will simply avoid 
coming into the centre; but all that shows is that it can be appropriate for officials 
to use taxes (or advertising, or other strategies) to influence behaviour, as well as 




INDIVIDUALISM AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
In critically analysing 39 new offences of this kind created in a single year, 1997, 
Ashworth finds yet more to disagree with about supposedly modern trends in 
criminalisation than the sheer number of offences and the proliferation of 
regulatory offences. He divides them for the purposes of analysis as follows: 
 
1. Thirteen requiring proof of intention or recklessness, most concerned 
with the provision of false information. 
2. Nine strict liability offences, with defences placing the burden on the 
accused; 
3. Eight omission-based offences, with defences placing the burden on the 
accused; 
4. Six strict liability offences, with no applicable defences.108 
 
He then goes on to say: 
 
[T]he bulk of new offences are characterised by three features – strict liability, 
omissions liability, and reverse onus provisions for exculpation. All these 
features lie a considerable distance from the conception of criminal laws held 
by many university teachers and criminal practitioners. Indeed, they are 
inconsistent with prominent elements of the rhetoric of English criminal law 
– that there is a presumption that mens rea is a prerequisite of criminal liability, 
that liability for omissions is exceptional, and that “one golden thread” 
                                                     
108 Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 227-28. 
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running through English criminal law is that the prosecution bears the burden 
of proving guilt.109 
 
There are three points to be made about the claims just set out. First, there is 
absolutely nothing new (post-1945) about the presence of strict liability and 
omission-based liability, reverse burdens, or the criminalisation, without more, of 
the provision of false information. The 1920 legislation considered earlier has 
many such provisions, and Maitland was moved to remark on them in his work on 
constitutional law 30 years before that.110 They are part of what has for long been 
the ‘natural law’ of regulatory strategy and enforcement (broadly, rational choice 
theory) that has for hundreds of years cast a barely acknowledged shadow over the 
vaunted ‘golden thread’ thesis.111  
Secondly, the foundations of Ashworth’s argument seem surprisingly 
contentious.112 Do we really know if it is true that reverse onus provisions, 
together with strict and omissions-based liability, detract equally and to the same 
extent from the conception of criminal law held by most university teachers and 
criminal practitioners? Even if they do, what do these groups – or majorities 
within them - have in common that makes their conception of the criminal law the 
right normative starting-point, and not just a focal point for a liberal rallying cry 
against a perceived curse of modernisation? Thirdly, Ashworth does not use as an 
organising distinction whether or not the offences in question are regulatory in 
character, even though he acknowledges that, ‘the bulk of the new offences may 
be described as “regulatory”, in the sense that they form part of statutory schemes 
for the regulation of certain spheres of social or commercial activity, and are 
generally enforced by the regulatory authority rather than by the police’.113 This is 
a significant point in this context, because I suggest that some of the concerns that 
Ashworth raises about the breadth of criminal liability draw their moral strength 
from a supposition that it is an individual, not a business, facing conviction.  
Ashworth has a strong preference for the use of intention and recklessness as 
fault elements in any ‘criminal’ law; indeed, he goes so far as to say that these fault 
elements should be intrinsic to the ‘paradigm crime’.114 Further, he is not – with 
some important exceptions115 – a supporter of the widespread use of criminal 
liability for omissions. Taking the issue of fault elements first, even when the 
criminal liability of individuals is in issue, one may question the claim that 
intention or recklessness should be intrinsic to the ‘paradigm crime’. In France – 
not especially noted for the brutality of its criminal code – criminal liability for 
                                                     
109 Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 228 (footnotes omitted). 
110 See text at n. 136 below. 
111 See, for example, the early regulatory scheme set up under the Knackers Act 1786. 
112 For an argument similar to Ashworth’s, see Husak, n.1 above, at 34. 
113 Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 228. 
114 Ashworth n. 1 above, at p. 241. 
115 Ashworth, n. 4 above. 
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negligently caused harm is possible for a number of stigmatic offences against the 
person.116 In English law, rape is a paradigm crime, but few would now be 
prepared to argue for the old view that the fault element should be an intention to 
have non-consensual sexual intercourse, or subjective recklessness as to whether 
such intercourse might take place, rather than some form of negligence as to the 
absence of consent.117 The fact that intention and recklessness may be highly 
morally significant in some contexts – in the civil as well as in the criminal law – 
does nothing to show that they are, or should be, of intrinsic significance within 
the criminal law as a whole.118 This is well illustrated by the fact that when 
companies are accused of offences, there are in fact serious objections to the use 
of intention and recklessness as fault elements. If subjective fault elements are 
used in the definition of crimes aimed at companies, this almost inevitably entails 
the application of the ‘identification’ doctrine of corporate criminal liability to such 
elements.119 According to that doctrine, if the company is to be found guilty of an 
offence involving proof of fault, an individual company director (or equivalent 
person) must be found to have possessed the relevant fault element at the time in 
question.120 As is well-known, the larger the company and the more diffuse, 
regionalised or contracted-out its operations, the less likely it is that any director 
(or equivalent person) will have actually known or suspected that an employee 
might commit a criminal offence involving proof of subjective fault.121  
It is not surprising, thus, that when corporate liability is in issue, 
Governments of different political stripes have preferred to shift the burden and 
costs of proof of lack of fault to the company, by moulding a broader conception 
of fault to fit the goals of regulatory compliance. Governments have frequently 
done this by requiring the company to prove not that it was unaware of and 
intended no wrongdoing (a negative), but that it exercised all due diligence and 
took all reasonable steps to avoid the wrongdoing being committed (a positive).122 
As many commentators have pointed out, this broader perspective on fault 
enables legal analysis to be applied to the way that corporate systems operate to 
reduce or increase risks, rather than to be applied simply to what particular 
individuals knew or did not know at a given moment. The broader perspective is 
also, though, sufficiently flexible to accommodate the fact that, in the case of sole 
                                                     
116 French Penal Code, Articles 221-6, 222-19. 
117 For the old view, see DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182. 
118 For criticism of Ashworth’s view that the importance of a principle can be broadly measured by the 
generality of its application, see John Gardner, ‘Ashworth on Principles’, in Lucia Zedner and Julian V 
Roberts, Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
at 7-10. For more discussion of the role of intention and recklessness in regulatory contexts, see the 
Conclusion below. 
119 Law Commission, n. 34 above, part 5. 
120 Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass [1972] AC 153 (HL). 
121 For a full discussion, see Law Commission,  n. 34 above,  Part 5.  
122 See the Law Commission’s discussion of, in particular, the use of criminal legislation in the consumer 
protection field, n. 34 above, paras 3.83-3.112. For an appraisal of the role of proving due diligence, see 
Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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proprietorships or their equivalent, it is not so much rule-governed ‘systems’ that 
guide business decisions but individual effort and care.123 
Ashworth himself is amongst a number of commentators who have called for 
a more punitive approach to wrongdoing by companies,124 although the focus of 
such calls is almost always medium to large-sized businesses that are far fewer in 
number than sole proprietorships or their equivalent (although they generate a 
greater share of GDP). Accordingly, in what follows, I shall also assume that the 
focus is medium to large-sized businesses. At issue is the extent to which the 
understanding and shape of the criminal law should be driven by values central to 
individual human lives, such as treatment with concern (as capable of emotional 
suffering) and respect (as capable of giving an intelligent conception of the good 
intrinsic value in their lives), dignity and personal autonomy. In Ashworth and 
Zedner’s account of criminal law, such values drive what they call their, ‘liberal 
conception of the criminal law that treats individuals as autonomous moral agents 
[…]’.125 However, the nature of companies is such that they do not need to be 
treated with concern in the sense just given, because the stigma of conviction 
cannot induce emotional suffering in these bodies as such, they do not have any 
dignity to be trampled on by reverse burdens of proof, and they do not have any 
personal autonomy to be threatened by omissions-based liability or by the 
imposition of risk-based penalisation. Penal legislation directed at such companies 
must be both morally permissible and the best option in the circumstances, it must 
allocate burdens in a fair way, and it must be proportionate (all of which is also 
true in relation to individual criminal liability), but beyond that it need not reflect 
the much fuller range of concerns at issue when individuals face penalisation. 
There is no space to deal with these issues adequately here, but let me by way of 
example look at two questions bearing on the issue of personal autonomy: the 
risk-based nature of much regulatory criminal law, and its reliance on omissions-
based liability. 
As we have seen, regulatory criminal law frequently adopts an anticipatory 
perspective on penalisation,126 being comprised largely of so-called prophylactic 
crimes, offences where, ‘the risk of […] harm does not arise straightforwardly 
from the prohibited act. It arises only after further human interventions either by 
the original actor or by others’.127 Engaging in a form of regulated trading without 
a licence is perhaps a good example. In itself, such a practice may pose no risks of 
harm on a given occasion; but sooner or later, if people engage in the regulated 
trade without meeting the licensing conditions necessary to engage in that trade, 
                                                     
123 This is acknowledged, for example, by the Law Commission in its recognition that less may be 
expected of small firms in terms of bureaucratic accountability, when it comes to putting in place 
adequate systems to prevent bribery: Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Report No. 313), part 6.  
124 Ashworth, n. 1 above, at 251. 
125 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Prevention and Criminalisation: Justifications and Limits’ 
(2012) 15 New Criminal Law Review 542. 
126 See Horder, n. 5 above. 
127 Simester and von Hirsch, n.1 above, at 79. 
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the risk of harm from poor trading practices will rise to unacceptable levels.128 
Even so, Ashworth and Zedner criticise the criminalisation of much risk-based 
offending on the following basis: 
 
To hold a person responsible now for her possible future actions (i.e. without 
proof of an intent to do the actions), as may occur in respect of pre-inchoate 
liability and crimes of possession, is objectionable in principle, since such a 
prediction “denies my responsible agency by treating me as someone who 
cannot be trusted to guide his actions by the appropriate reasons”.129 
 
One difficulty with this argument is its narrowness. It relies on there being a 
distinction of great moral significance between simple possession, and an intention 
to do something (wrong) in relation to the thing possessed; but in many instances 
this distinction is not morally significant.130 Very commonly, when the law 
imposes restrictions on possession, it does so because to possess the thing is 
thereby to become morally responsible for its treatment in a certain (harm-reducing 
or welfare-enhancing) way, irrespective of one’s intentions in that respect. An 
example might be the possession of animals, whether domestic pets (the keeping 
of which is governed by the Animal Welfare Act 2006), or dangerous wild animals 
(governed by the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976). To be in possession – and 
especially, of course, to be an owner – of a protected animal is in and of itself to 
be under an obligation to treat that animal in a certain way, whatever one’s 
intentions with regard to it; and the heavy regulatory structure governing the 
treatment of animals in all manner of contexts reflects this.131 So, to give a 
memorable example from the early Victorian era, simply by coming into 
possession of an eagle, a jackal and a bear when he came up to Christ Church, 
Oxford, Frank Buckland (son of the famous naturalist, William Buckland) came 
under an obligation to treat those animals in a certain way. Breach of that 
obligation is now rightly treated as a criminal offence under the Dangerous Wild 
Animals Act 1976 Act.132 
A second, related difficulty with Ashworth and Zedner’s argument is its over-
robust individualism. Buckland, no doubt, thought that his intentions were benign, 
and – given that he was acknowledged as an authority on animals – would 
                                                     
128 This claim assumes that the licensing conditions in question are indeed necessary and appropriate for 
reducing risks of poor trading practices to acceptable levels. In that respect, there are many studies that 
engage in economic analysis of licensing conditions. See, for example, John W Borowski and Gerard CS 
Mildner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Taxicab Regulation in Portland, Oregon’, 
http://cascadepolicy.org/pdf/env/taxi_reg.htm.  
129 Ashworth and Zedner, n. 73 above, citing RA Duff, n. 1 above, at 165. 
130 Elsewhere, Ashworth has in fact conceded that there may be a case for the criminalisation of 
possession beyond cases in which the possession is motivated by an intention to do some future 
(harmful) action: see Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offences’ (2011) 5 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 237. 
131 See the statutes mentioned in the text following n. 60 above. 
132 For the full story, see Noel Annan, The Dons (London: Harper Collins, 1999), ch 2. Buckland named 
the bear Tiglath-Pileser, and dressed ‘Tig’ in a cap and gown before taking him to wine parties where Tig 
could be hypnotised for the amusement of other guests. 
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certainly have regarded any regulatory state restrictions on his possession of the 
animals as, to use Ashworth and Zedner’s words, ‘objectionable in principle […] 
by treating [him] as someone who cannot be trusted to guide his actions by the 
appropriate reasons’. The introduction of a standard-setting licence to engage in 
conduct only on certain conditions is an expression of the perfectly legitimate 
belief that, were no such standard enforced, too many individuals wishing to 
engage in that conduct may indeed turn out to be people who, ‘cannot be trusted 
to guide [their] actions by the appropriate reasons’, in a context where a free-for-
all approach may lead to unacceptable levels of risk of harm. In many areas of 
activity, individuals act in conditions of far more imperfect knowledge than the 
state and the experts who inform the state’s decisions, as well as differing greatly 
in the level of their personal commitment to a concern for preventing harm, in the 
resources they have that can be devoted to promoting the safety of others, and so 
on. Trusting the individual to do the right thing, then, may quite often turn out to 
be a wrong and unacceptable option, particularly when the chances of an 
individual devising his or her own harm-free path inevitably depend on the way in 
which many others potentially affected seek to determine their own paths.133 This 
is not, of course, to advocate universal nanny-state paternalism. In introducing 
licensing schemes for a restricted range of activities, a government is not denying 
to an individual the right to determine for him or herself what ends (including that 
activity) to pursue in the exercise of his or her autonomy. For good harm-
prevention reasons government is, instead, simply setting down a structure within 
which that end may more safely be pursued, in the light of the need to 
accommodate others’ possibly cheek-by-jowl pursuit of their own ends, and so 
on.134 
More pertinently, the difficulty with the argument is that its application to 
corporate liability is far from secure. In relation to the liability of mentally 
competent and mature individuals, Ashworth and Zedner are only on strong 
ground when a pre-inchoate offence is concerned with conduct based on reasons 
the appropriateness of which it would be better to leave the individual him or 
herself to determine. An example might the decision to buy potentially dangerous 
items such as a kitchen knife, weed killer, pain killers or bleach. In such cases, the 
chances of misuse may be too small, the importance of expert guidance too 
negligible, and the cost of regulation too high bearing in mind the numbers of 
people engaging in the conduct perfectly safely, for state intervention to be 
                                                     
133 In short, Ashworth and Zedner, overlook the state’s need to impose rules that have binding force 
even when in particular circumstances individuals may be confident that will do better if guided by 
reasons they bona fide regard as appropriate: see John M Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), ch IX, XI, XII.3. 
134 It follows, I think, that licensing schemes may have to be ruled out completely, in that they 
inappropriately trespass on autonomy, only where the intrinsic value of the activity harmless-in-itself lies 
in the very fact that it is engaged in, for example, spontaneously, as an expression of creative freedom, 
through the dictates of religious faith, privately, and in other analogous examples; but that is not a point 
that can be argued here. 
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worthwhile. These considerations may or may not be decisive in any given case, 
quite apart from any personal autonomy-based consideration militating against 
intervention. However, companies cannot enjoy personal autonomy. So, whatever 
other reasons there may be against the criminalisation of activity companies 
engage in, the protection of personal autonomy will not be amongst them.135 
Corporate activities may generate a great deal of autonomy-enhancing value for 
those who work in them and for the public at large,136 but that value is not value 
intrinsic to companies’ own ‘lives’. So, whilst Governments may, perhaps wrongly, 
fail to trust companies to be guided by appropriate reasons, such a failure cannot 
manifest an improper interference with personal autonomy in the way that it can 
when a government treats a mentally competent individual person in such a way. 
To give a simple example, section 387 of the Companies Act 2006 requires a 
company to keep proper accounting records that show its financial position 
reasonably accurately. By contrast, an individual is under no such duty in relation 
to his or her financial affairs even though the imposition of such a duty might be 
socially beneficial; and the explanation for that is very much the one that 
Ashworth and Zedner offer, in terms of the importance of personal autonomy. 
An analogous point can be made regarding liability for omissions. Extensive 
liability for omissions in business contexts has been around for a very long time. 
In the late 1880s, in his discussion of active duties, FW Maitland was moved to 
observe that: 
 
[I]f one takes up any business or employment, if one begins to build a house 
or thinks to open a lodging-house, or keep a trading ship or be a baker or be 
a chimney sweep, straightway one comes into contact with a mass of statutory 
rules, and if one keeps all the rules expressly laid down by statute still one is 
not safe, one may come across the rules, orders and regulations which some 
Secretary of State or central board has been empowered to make […]137 
 
Omissions-based liability may threaten personal autonomy. This is because, in 
requiring positive action, it severely restricts the range of choices or activities 
someone may engage in at a given moment. By contrast, a prohibition on actively 
doing something merely forbids someone from making a given choice or engaging 
in a particular activity, from an otherwise limitless number of permissible choices 
or activities.138 However, if, as entities, companies cannot enjoy personal 
autonomy, the special wrong involved when liability for omissions undermines 
individuals’ personal autonomy is absent when such liability extends to 
                                                     
135 By that, I mean that companies, even though they engage in these activities, cannot generate for 
themselves any intrinsic value through, in Raz’s words, ‘controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’: Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at 369. 
136 On this, see Jeremy Horder, ‘Strict Liability, Statutory Construction, and the Spirit of Liberty’ (2002) 
118 Law Quarterly Review 458. 
137 Maitland, n. 6 above, at 505. 
138 See further, Andrew Simester, ‘Why Omissions are Special’ (1995) 1 Legal Theory 311. 
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companies.139 There is, for example, a very great deal of difference between, on 
the one hand (to give the classic example), imposing on individuals enjoying a day 
at the beach a duty to help someone in peril at sea, and on the other hand, placing 
a duty on a ship’s master to provide assistance to another ship in distress at sea. 
The former may be objectionable as an unwarranted threat to the personal 
autonomy of those enjoying their day at the beach, whereas the latter has long 
been a relatively uncontroversial legal requirement.140 Although the ship’s master’s 
obligation to rescue is an obligation placed on an individual, the obligation engages 
the master in his professional role as a representative of the company, as not as an 






I believe that neutrality on the question of whether there are ‘too many’ criminal 
offences is the best approach for criminal lawyers, whose primary task is to analyse 
such claims in the different contexts in which they come to prominence, 
historically, politically, and so on. In that regard, though, it must be recognised 
that the criminal law is no longer the weapon of choice that it was, for those 
seeking to regulate conduct in a large variety of contexts. The Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 was meant to put the criminal law firmly in 
its place as a means of pursuing only repeated or ‘serious’ wrongdoing in 
regulatory contexts, with other kinds of warning and sanction playing a much 
more prominent role at the front line.141 It is clear that many regulatory and 
enforcement bodies support that kind of approach in general, but in their 
responses to Law Commission’s proposals, trading standards bodies also 
unintentionally revealed the inevitable ambivalence and difficulty involved in 
deciding when and whether conduct constitutes ‘serious’ wrongdoing. This is 
hardly surprising, given the inherent vagueness of the term ‘serious’, and the sheer 
range of factors that may bear on an evaluation in that respect.142 The Association 
of Chief Trading standards Officers said, for example: 
 
Sometimes [it may be] appropriate to prosecute less serious crime – [it] can be 
effective for tackling more serious issues e.g. under Cancellation of Contracts 
Concluded in a Consumer’s Home or Place to Work Regulations 2008. 
                                                     
139 Moreover, risks associated with liability for omissions can be managed or out-sourced by a company in 
a way that an individual, in the nature of things, cannot do. 
140 ‘A master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving 
information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their 
assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so […]’: 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of life at Sea, ch 5 Regulation 33(1). 
141 See the discussion in Law Commission, n. 34 above. 
142 On this, see Horder, n. 5 above. 
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Initially [it] may appear waste of courts time and disproportionate to [the] 
scale of offence, but doorstep crime is usually overpriced, prevalent, can lead 
to serious fraud, and shown to be linked to distraction burglary. Prosecution 
for fraud or attempted [fraud] will be considered if possible but where [there 
is] no evidence, [and] circumstances suggest the offender would have 
progressed to more serious offending had enforcement agencies not stepped 
in, prosecution under Regulations may be only option for Trading Standards 
Services.143 
 
Against that background, the Office of Fair Trading highlights the difficulty of 
trying to hive off criminal offences from other measures aimed at regulatory 
compliance, in essence because of the vagueness of ‘seriousness’ when it comes to 
an attempt to confine the criminal law to ‘serious’ offences: 
 
Our concern is that all or most breaches of the law that we and partner 
authorities enforce can sometimes demand prompt use of criminal sanctions. 
Most kinds of regulatory breach are capable of incorporating conduct that 
involves serious malpractice and/or a serious threat of harm to consumers, 
for example, rogue traders overcharging vulnerable consumers for 
unnecessary work […] it would be undesirable (and challenging) to reframe 
the law such that parties are subject to criminal prosecution only where 
significant harm results and/or there is evidence of a high level of culpability. 
Under-enforcement would reduce the incentive for traders to comply not 
only with the law, but with the preliminary (or soft enforcement approaches) 
widely used by enforcement authorities as a mean of gaining compliance 
without resort to the courts.144 
 
One important reason for thinking that the criminalisation of conduct – such as, 
say, a negligent failure to return accounts on time – may be justifiable even though 
it is not ‘serious’ lies in these consultation responses. There is obviously a 
difference between, on the one hand, the seriousness of a piece of conduct as a 
wrong, and on the other hand, an evaluation of the seriousness of wrongdoing in 
context. The definition of a crime is better suited to capture the former, because 
the delineation of culpable conduct can normally be made a relatively clear-cut 
matter in regulatory contexts.145 The prosecutorial or sentencing decision-making 
stage is the best forum in which to address the latter, on which many 
incommensurable factors, and matters of degree, will have a bearing. In that 
regard, in regulatory contexts, the fact that wrongdoing was engaged in 
intentionally or recklessly may simply be one dimension respecting which the 
                                                     
143 n. 93 above, para 1.90 (my emphasis). 
144 http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp195_Criminal_Liability_responses.pdf, para 1.6. 
145 Which increases its value, in terms of the need to comply with fair warning requirements of what is 
criminally prohibited, for the purposes of Article 7 of the European Convention. Naturally, I am aware 
that many offences draw on (un)reasonableness, or on similarly vague terms, to define wrongful conduct. 
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wrongdoing was serious in context; that fact alone cannot wholly convincingly be 
understood as involving the crossing of a unique threshold separating criminal 
from civil liability. 
Consider this example. Suppose (1) that Company D negligently fails to 
return accounts, (2) that such conduct fits the definition of an offence, and (3) that 
Company D has on three occasions negligently failed to return accounts in spite of 
warnings received. A regulator or prosecutor is more likely to say – and probably 
rightly so – that Company D is now guilty of ‘serious’ wrongdoing that warrants 
criminal proceedings. We can, of course, make no sense of the idea that repetition 
of the offence makes wrongdoing more serious unless we have a basic offence to 
be repeated; but a similar point could be made about, for example, an offender’s 
failure beforehand to seek the help of a regulator in an effort to reduce the risk of 
the offence occurring, or of an offender’s failure to put in place safeguards 
recommended by a regulator prior to the commission of the offence.146 In neither 
of these examples, though, is it true to say that it is the intentional or reckless 
character of the wrongdoing that plays a unique role in making it serious. Indeed 
the presence of these fault elements may play no such role at all. Suppose, in the 
example just given, that between each negligent failure to return accounts on time, 
the company was taken over and new directors appointed who were unaware of 
previous failings. In such a case, the repetition of the offence by the company can 
still make the offending behaviour more serious, even if it is admitted that the 
offence was never committed intentionally or recklessly. The presence of intention 
or recklessness can sometimes add something to the seriousness of offending in 
regulatory contexts, but it is not as such the key to understanding the seriousness 
of such offending. 
So far as regulatory criminal offences are concerned what is needed is, first, 
an appreciation of the historic role they have played: forming part of the structure 
of a regulatory arm to the state that has made possible the promotion of public 
goods across many fields of human activity, at a level and with a breadth 
unimaginable 300 years ago. In saying that, I fully acknowledge that regulatory 
offences have rarely been enforced, and when they have been enforced it has, 
historically, often been in a corrupt, discriminatory or class-biased way.147 My 
point concerns the perceived importance to legislators of integrating criminal law 
into regulatory schemes of virtually all kinds. Secondly, counter-reformation 
thinkers need to confront the reality that the substantive and procedural lines 
between ‘truly’ criminal offences and ‘merely’ administrative penalties have begun 
to become, and will continue to become, more blurred. This will happen as 
elements of arbitrariness, anomaly, and inefficiency involved in keeping them 
wholly separate undermine the goal of proportionate enforcement practice, and 
                                                     
146 In the UK, some 70% of small businesses seek official advice or guidance at some point on their 
business practices. 
147 See, e.g. Steadman, n. 8 above. 
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create unfairness from the point of view of those targeted by one form of 
penalisation rather than the other. In that regard, the introduction by schedule 17 
of the Crime and Courts Bill 2012 of Deferred Prosecution Agreements that (in 
spite of the agreement to defer) can incorporate a financial penalty, is a good 
example of how such blurring is being used to escape the arbitrariness or 
unfairness that may come about through an insistence on such separation. The 
counter-reformation has arrived, predictably enough, just when the changing 
landscape of sanctioning is threatening – for perfectly understandable reasons – to 
make a nonsense of the idea that (putting aside the special case of liability to a 
term of imprisonment), in seeking to identify what fairness in procedure requires, 
one must first decide whether or not the proceedings or the punishments are 
‘criminal’. 
Thirdly, what should be acknowledged more clearly is the legitimacy of the 
‘two cultures’ of criminal law that now, very broadly speaking, exist side by side as 
modes of governance (albeit with much blurring and cross-application). On the 
one hand, there is penal liability imposed on individuals, where both the limits and 
the nature of liability must be shaped by values such as dignity, personal 
autonomy, concern and respect. On the other hand, there is penal liability imposed 
on companies, where these values have little or no application, and where 
instrumental considerations of efficiency play a legitimate role in penalisation 
decisions, even though values such as fairness and proportionality also play an 
important role. Counter-reformation thinkers have sought to generalise some of 
the values that are significant when determining individual liability, in order to 
make them definitive of criminalisation as a whole, even though those values are 
not at stake when corporate criminal liability is in issue. Their omission, then, is to 
fail to acknowledge the plurality of values that legitimately affect criminalisation 
decisions (and penalisation decisions more generally), something reformation 
thinkers did not fail to do, even if reformation thinkers themselves failed to draw 
sufficient attention to the general importance of values such as fairness and 
proportionality in the taking of such decisions. 
 
 
 
